Do We Need More Futures Contracts
in Commodity Markets? by Mattos, Fabio
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Cornhusker Economics Agricultural Economics Department
11-28-2018
Do We Need More Futures Contracts in
Commodity Markets?
Fabio Mattos
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecon_cornhusker
Part of the Agricultural Economics Commons, and the Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Agricultural Economics Department at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska -
Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cornhusker Economics by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska -
Lincoln.
Mattos, Fabio, "Do We Need More Futures Contracts in Commodity Markets?" (2018). Cornhusker Economics. 982.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/agecon_cornhusker/982
agecon.unl.edu/cornhuskereconomics 
  Cornhusker Economics 
 
It is the policy of the University of Nebraska–Lincoln not to discriminate based upon age, race, 
ethnicity, color, national origin, gender-identity, sex, pregnancy, disability, sexual orientation, 
genetic information, veteran’s status, marital status, religion or political affiliation.  
November 28, 2018 
Do We Need More Futures Contracts  
in Commodity Markets? 
 
In the last couple of months, there has been news 
about a new futures contract for soybeans. The Fi-
nancial Times and Reuters, among others, reported 
that the CME Group, the world’s largest futures ex-
change, is considering launching a futures contract 
based on Brazilian soybeans. The discussion seems to 
have started after trade issues between the United 
States and China resulted in a 25 percentage-point 
tariff on U.S. soybeans exported to China. As Chi-
nese buyers try to avoid the tariff by purchasing 
grain from other suppliers, notably Brazil, a new 
price dynamics between U.S. and Brazilian soybeans 
could be emerging. This raises the question of wheth-
er there would still be enough price correlation be-
tween the two countries for Brazilian producers and 
merchandisers to use the Chicago futures contract to 
hedge their soybean transactions. If the soybean 
price in Brazil is really becoming less correlated with 
the soybean price in the U.S., the local basis in Brazil 
will be less predictable and hence the hedging with 
Chicago futures contracts will become relatively less 
effective. 
A similar idea came out in the early 2000’s, which 
resulted in the Chicago Board of Trade (which is 
now part of the CME Group) eventually launching 
its South American soybean futures contract in May 
2005. The new futures contract had delivery points in 
Brazil and hence was expected to reduce basis risk 
for Brazilian hedgers compared to the traditional 
soybean futures contract at the Chicago Board of 
Trade. However, the contract never attracted many 
producers and merchandisers with commercial in-
terests in Brazil, and neither had it attracted many 
speculators. Since this contract never gained much 
trading activity, it was terminated after a while.  
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  11-24-18 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .  120.50  115.00  117.01 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  180.17  172.62  172.26 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  165.83  160.01  150.03 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  208.70  211.50  213.76 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  57.03  58.38  49.32 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  81.14  75.57  65.86 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  NA  135.62  NA 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  388.34  378.61  376.40 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.14  4.46  4.25 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.11  3.34  3.34 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  9.03  7.32  7.57 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.42  5.30  5.25 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2.83  3.16  3.12 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  162.50  108.00  * 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  80.00  105.00  110.00 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  80.50  87.50  87.50 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  142.00  135.00  160.00 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  42.00  48.50  49.75 
 ⃰ No Market          
One of the main issues with the South American soybean 
futures contract created in 2005 was the same that afflicted 
other new futures contracts in history, which is the inertia 
of liquidity. The success of futures markets in commodities, 
equities, currencies and other asset classes relies, among 
other things, on the fact that it concentrates in the same 
place a large number of buyers and sellers willing to do 
business. This is actually one of the main reasons why fu-
tures markets were created a long time ago, i.e. to offer buy-
ers and sellers a centralized marketplace where it would be 
easier and faster to find someone to trade with at a price 
that was satisfactory for both sides of the trade. 
However, when new futures contracts are created, traders 
are often cautious in the beginning, and they do not trade 
as heavily as they would in more established futures con-
tracts. They still want to learn how the new contract works, 
who is trading there, how the prices for the new contract 
behave, how much they can trade without moving the mar-
ket, and so on. But if nobody really starts trading more 
heavily until others do, trading activity will never pick up. 
This is what commonly happens with new futures con-
tracts, and also one of the main reasons why many of them 
are eventually terminated. 
Is it common to have more than one actively traded fu-
tures market for agricultural commodities? 
In the world of agricultural commodities, there is typically 
one futures contract for each commodity. It is unusual to 
find more than one futures contract on the same commodi-
ty (except for commodities with different varieties, such as 
wheat and coffee), mostly because of the liquidity issue that 
we discussed above. Still, in 2012, the Intercontinental Ex-
change (ICE) tried to create more competition in the mar-
ket by launching futures contracts on corn, wheat, soy-
beans, soybean meal and soybean oil, which had already 
been trading in the CME Group for several decades. All of 
the ICE new contracts resembled the futures contracts trad-
ed at the CME Group and were actually based on the CME 
Group’s own prices. The ICE tried to gain some market 
share in the futures trading for grains and oilseeds by offer-
ing essentially the same futures contracts as the CME 
Group, but with extended trading hours and lower margin 
requirements. Again, traders chose to wait and see what 
others would do before they started trading and it turns out 
that these contracts never attracted much trading activity 
and were eventually terminated last summer. 
An old adage in futures markets says, “Liquidity begets li-
quidity”. Markets with high trading activity will often at-
tract more traders, while markets with low trading activity 
will rarely attract more traders. For any new futures con-
tract, the main challenge is how to attract enough traders to 
create sufficient activity that will encourage other traders to 
join the market. For example, if a new soybean futures con-
tract is created, traders (both hedgers and speculators) will 
essentially be asking the questions: “Can the new con-
tract give me something that the existing contract can-
not?” and “Will I benefit from the new contract even if 
it may not be as highly traded as the existing con-
tract?” (Some interesting readings about this topic can 
be found in [1, 2, 3]). 
New developments in different commodity markets 
may create more interest in new futures contracts over 
time. For example, a recent article about the wheat mar-
ket discusses how the decline of U.S. share in produc-
tion and exports and the emergence of former Soviet 
Union countries (specifically Russia, Ukraine and Ka-
zakhstan) as large exporters may be changing the price 
dynamics in the world market [4]. The growing im-
portance of wheat production in Europe would make 
local supply and demand relatively more relevant to 
determine wheat prices in Europe. Hence, European 
producers and merchandisers would naturally seek a 
futures contract based in Europe, which should better 
reflect their supply and demand conditions and should 
allow them to manage their local basis more effectively. 
The article argues that this is one of the main reasons 
behind the increase in trading activity for the futures 
contract on milling wheat offered by the Euronext ex-
change in Paris in recent years. The U.S. futures mar-
kets for wheat are still the central stage for wheat pric-
ing in the world market, but the Europe-futures market 
for milling wheat has also become an important pricing 
platform. 
Another example could be the futures contracts for ag-
ricultural commodities in China, such as the ones trad-
ed at the Dalian Commodity Exchange (DCE). The 
growing participation of China in the world market for 
commodities (such as corn and soybeans) resembles the 
case of wheat discussed above, although in much larger 
magnitude. However, there are restrictions for foreign 
traders who want to trade in futures markets in China, 
which limits the ability of these futures markets to be-
come active pricing platforms for commodities in the 
world market. 
Back to the idea of a South American soybean futures 
contract: Do we need another futures contract for soy-
beans? 
The general notion that recent trade disputes have 
affected the price dynamics in the soybean world mar-
ket and hence “destabilized” the relationship between 
U.S. and Brazilian prices would, in principle, justify 
looking into a new futures contract to hedge Brazilian 
soybeans. However, it is not yet clear what lies ahead. If 
trade disputes are resolved and we return to the 
“traditional” price dynamics between U.S. and Brazilian 
prices, there may be no need for a new futures con- 
tact. If trade disputes persist, a new futures contract may be 
useful depending on how the new price dynamics develop. 
Looking ahead: May there be room for a new futures con-
tract for corn? 
The discussion about the potential for a new South Ameri-
can soybean futures contract brings to mind the changes 
that have been taking place in the corn market. In the last 
10-15 years, Brazil has emerged as a major producer and 
exporter, as has the Ukraine more recently. The growing 
participation of Brazil and Ukraine and relatively smaller 
share of the United States in the world market raises the 
question of whether U.S. markets are still the central stage 
for corn pricing in the world. Although the answer is still 
likely to be yes, this could be changing in coming years. Re-
cent articles that looked into the price dynamics in the corn 
market suggest that Brazil and Ukraine are already becom-
ing more influential in corn pricing in the world market [5, 
6, 7, 8]. If this movement continues in the future, in a few 
years we may be reading about ideas to launch new futures 
contracts for corn based in South America and/or Europe 
(or about increasing trading activity in the corn futures 
contracts already offered by B3 in Brazil and Euronext in 
France). 
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